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Governance in the Not-For-Profit Sector: In International Perspective 
 
Abstract 
The Global Financial Crisis demonstrated the importance of accountability, transparency and 
good corporate governance for both not-for-profit (NFP) or for-profit organisations. Not-for-
profit entities on an international basis play a significant role in world economies in relation to 
welfare, economic growth and employment (OECD 2009). This research explores the current 
type of governance mechanisms used to monitor and control international not-for-profit (NFP) 
entities and to compare to current practices for Australian NFPs. The question explored is how 
much control is exercised by mainly voluntary directors in a sector dominated by time and 
budgetary constraints. NFP entities were analysed for their corporate governance in terms of 
accountability in their annual reports, which also includes analysis of the board of directors. 
Although international not-for-profit entities are a significant contributor to international social 
responsibility as well as employment and GDP, this research shows a significant lack of 
accountability by reviewing their 2010 annual reports. The Australian NFPs demonstrated 
greater transparency and governance in their annual reports than international NFPs. 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Corporate Governance, NFP Governance, Social Responsibility. 
General Topic: Corporate Governance 
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Governance in the Not-For-Profit Sector: In International Perspective 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the United Nations (2003, p.3), not-for-profit institutions (NFP) “constitute a 
significant and growing economic force in countries throughout the world,” and Lewis (2005) 
argues that this sector is a growing worldwide phenomenon. Given the importance of this sector, 
this paper argues that the governance and accountability of these organizations should be 
monitored. Because NFP entities are a significant contributor to social responsibility, 
employment and GDP (OECD, 2009), it is important that directors are aware of their 
responsibilities, which at times, are higher than that of paid board members (AICD, 2012).  
The Australian Charity and Not-For-Profits Commission Bill (2012) places “personal liabilities” 
on volunteer directors, over and above that of the current corporate law (Corporations Law, 
2011). It effectively states that as the directors are volunteers they do not need to be protected 
against the corporate veil. The Australian Institute of Company Directors stated that Australia 
should avoid becoming “the first country in the world to make it more onerous for directors to sit 
on a NFP Board” (AICD, 2012). This is also echoed by the Chartered Secretaries of Australia 
who state that the Bill imposed “obligations, liabilities and offences” for those responsible for 
NFP entities.   
In Australia the importance of directors and disclosure in NFP entities was recognised in the 
2008 Senate Standing Committee on Economics Report – “Disclosure regimes for Charities and 
Not for profits Organisations”, which recommended that new disclosure regimes should include 
numeric as well as narrative reporting, acknowledging that stakeholders need more information 
than NFPs were currently giving. Under this legal setting, it is understood that the formal 
director’s duties are just as important in corporations and NFP entities, and that corporate 
governance as a mechanism is an important part of the running of such entities as it is for other 
businesses. This paper builds an assessment of the literature that provides the framework for 
assessing the NFP organisation sampled. Against this background this research is focused, firstly 
on the use of corporate governance by NFP entities on an International basis, and then 
specifically on Australian NFPS and their level of corporate governance disclosure.  The paper 
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concludes with a summary of key findings and makes several recommendations for NFP 
organisations to consider. 
Not-For-Profit Entities and Governance 
 
Mason (1984) identified many differences between non-profit and profit-seeking organisations. 
The differences, however, appear to be superficial, as NFPs are subjected to many of the same 
threats and constraints as other businesses. To some extent their ‘public image’ is contingent on 
explicit governance mechanisms. The two main corporate governance issues concerning NFPs 
are, board structure and the relationship between boards and executives (Golensky 1993, 
Heimovics, Herman and Jurkiewicz 1993, Murray, Bradshaw and Wolpin 1992). Conflict 
between paid professionals and volunteers regarding the control of the organisation and the 
process of decision-making has been researched by Kikulis, Slack and Hinings (1995) and Auld 
(1997). Their findings show paid professionals and volunteers tend to have differing views about 
how the business ought to be run, and the relationship they should have towards each other, 
especially if volunteers are not held accountable for their performance. 
The NFP model “stresses the values of community participation, due process and stewardship 
(whereas) the corporate model stresses the value of strategy development, risk taking and 
competitive positioning” (Alexander and Weiner 1998 p.224). Although it appears the two 
models have significant differences, we also acknowledge that each must, first, be financially 
viable. That is, all businesses whether NFPs or not, must make money to be able to distribute it.  
While Lyons (2001) perceives NFP organisations’ governance frameworks as being democratic, 
and the values pursued by those managing NFPs  differ from those driving the operations of 
profit-seeking firms, he recognises that systems of revenue generation, difficulty in 
accountability, the ability to judge performance, and a heavy reliance on volunteers,  may lead to 
conflict between boards and employees.  
According to McFarlan (1999), governance structures of both NFP and profit seeking 
organisations are impacted by their characteristically idiosyncratic missions, performance 
measures, evaluation of leadership, and their preferences for specific board compositions. The 
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definition of NFPs on an international level can be varied and Table 1 shows four definitions of 
NFPs used by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA.  
 
Table 1: International Definitions of NFPs 
Country of Origin Definition of NFP 
Australia An entity whose principal objective is not the generation of profit 
(AASB114 para AUS 8.1, 2004) 
Canada Guidance criteria of an NFP (CICA, 2013) A NFP organisation is an 
‘‘entity, normally without transferable ownership 
interests, organized and operated exclusively for social, educational, 
professional, religious, health, 
charitable or any other not-for-profit purpose’’.(CICA, p.4, 2013) 
New Zealand Determined by its primary objective with key and supporting 
indicators (ICANZ 2005) 
USA Non-business organisations (FASB, 1980) 
 
It is interesting to discover an array of literature on the application of corporate governance for 
NFPs. NFPs contribute towards social capital, and are generally perceived as being networks 
enjoying social trust, facilitating and coordinating for the mutual benefit of society (Putnam, 
1995). NFPs have different structures than for profit businesses, insofar as they frequently have 
the added complexity emerging from paid professionals working with volunteers and being 
accountable to society. The literature on corporate governance applications in relation to NFPs in 
particular focuses on the significant differences between for profit entities and charitable 
organisations.  
The survival of a NFP organisation depends on its ability to meet the community need more 
efficiently and effectively than its competitors. According to Drucker (1990) NFP organisations 
differ from corporate entities due to their differences in the decision-making structures and 
processes; that although their management techniques may be similar, fundamentally the 
governance framework adopted is different. Others, such as Young (1986), Mason (1984) as well 
as Alexander and Weiner (1998) agree with Drucker (1990) that profit-orientated and non-profit 
organisations differ in their governance frameworks. A study by Barnes (2011), showed that a 
6 
 
comparison of recommended international governance regimes, indicated that only five 
governance regimes were applicable in the NFP sector as shown in Table 2.  In this table the tick 
() indicates the presence of this requirement and a cross () indicates that it is not present. 
 
Table 2 Applicable Guidelines for NFP Governance 
 OECD (2004) Sarbanes 
Oxley 
(USA) 
(2003) 
Combined 
Code (UK) 
(2004) 
Australia 
Securities 
exchange 
(2004) 
Governance 
Framework 
    
Disclosure and 
Transparency 
    
Stakeholders     
Ethical Decision 
Making 
    
Risk Management     
 
Significance of Research 
 
Broadbent and Guthrie (2008, p. 130) state that, “public services are progressively seen by policy 
makers to be as significant as the commercial sector in the context of wider economic and social 
development.”  In their paper they illustrate this increased importance by drawing on World 
Bank documents.  For example, according to BRW (2008) there are between 700,000-750,000 
NFP entities operating in Australia alone. They employ 8.5% of the nation’s workforce, and for 
2006-2007 reported net assets of A$36.1 billion. They contributed 3.5% to the GDP (ABS 2002). 
Previous data in relation to NFP contributions indicated that in Australia, 3.4 million individuals 
contributed A$5.7 billion to charity, while corporations contributed A$3 million in 2003-2004. 
The charitable sector is often taken for granted and yet it contributes more to the Australian GDP 
than the communications sector and has more employees than the mining sector.  “But getting a 
clear picture of the sector is not so easy. Extraordinarily for a sector that plays such a big 
economic role, there has never been a complete survey of all its participants, . . . “ (Parkinson, 
2009, p.30).   
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NFP entities in Australia in 2010 had nearly 5 million volunteers contributing an additional 
$14.6 billion in unpaid work (Productivity Commission Research Report 2010). With this 
significant contribution to the economy, the governance and accountability of these organisations 
should be monitored. The recent (Australian) Directors Social Impact Study (2011) found that 
58% of directors surveyed sat on both NFP and corporate boards, with 89% of respondents 
indicating that they performed their role on a voluntary basis. Lewis (2005) argues that this 
sector is growing worldwide and it can also be argued that international NFP organisations 
should be noting how these issues impact their operations.   
 
NFP Board of Director Governance  
 
Management is concerned with organising, planning, controlling, and leading organisations with 
limited resources to achieve goals (Robbins, Bergman, Stagg and Coulter 2000), but governance 
also involves the limitation of powers to control and direct, and regulate organisations (Tricker 
1984). Governance is necessary for corporate entities, nation states, associations, clubs, and 
societies to function legitimately and efficiently for the benefit of those for whose wellbeing they 
are argued to have been created.  
The literature on corporate governance applications in relation to NFPs in particular focuses on 
the significant differences between for-profit entities and charitable organisations. Figure 1 
outlines a typical NFP organisational structure. 
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Figure 1: NFP Structure  
 
Corporate Governance Framework 
 
It is important to acknowledge Owens’ (2004) framework approach to corporate governance, of 
encompassing rules, regulations, systems and processes.  It is reasonable to assume that those 
dealing with NFPs would prefer to do so with one that worked within an explicit and good 
governance framework, than with one that failed to do so. Thus the framework approach being 
all-inclusive should be particularly important to NFPs as it does not dictate specific obligations, 
but takes a general approach, which for NFPs will include the acknowledgement of the previous 
principles of stakeholders, risk management and ethics.   
The governance framework should include information on the members of the board, their 
specific experience and how they “add-value” to the decision-making processes of the board. In 
the same way the separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO should be clearly indicated, as 
well comments on the independence of directors, and board equity. 
Hinchy & McDermott (2006, p.121) clearly define the role of directors, saying that “. . . the 
management role undertaken by directors requires that in the exercise of power they act honestly 
and in the best interests of shareholders and creditors.” Whereas in the past, some boards of 
Board of 
Directors 
Voluntary 
Paid Staff and 
Executives  
Volunteer 
Workers 
Membership – individuals and affiliated 
associations 
 
Voting 
Members at 
AGM 
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directors were made up of members elected because they knew someone on the board, they are 
now elected for their skills and their ability to add value to the board and by default, the business. 
Boards of directors for NFP entities must exhibit as much of their fiduciary duties as they would 
to a corporation, as they are still under Corporations Law (2001) legislation in the carrying out of 
these duties. 
Friedman and Phillips (2004) suggest that the traditional structure of a large NFP council (Board 
of Governors) and a plethora of committees seem unsuited in a context of complexity and 
change.  Structure must be proactive, determining mission, strategy and a responsive approach.  
They draw on other research that suggests smaller governing boards with memberships between 
8 to 15 are more appropriate. Large boards correlate with a lack of strategic direction and a 
reactive style of management.  As has been noted, “The Board is a critical asset for every 
nonprofit organization” (Brown, 2007).  The next section evaluates the characteristics that this 
paper considers important in terms of good corporate governance within the NFP sector. 
 
a) Independent Board Members 
The Joint Code of Professional Conduct defines independence as being free, in fact and 
appearance, of any interest which might be regarded, whatever its actual effect, as being 
incompatible with integrity and objectivity (Section B.4 Dellaportas, et al., 2005). “The field of 
corporate governance is concerned with the rules and principles that regulate the power 
relationship among owners (shareholders), directors and managers” (Goodman and Schwartz, 
2004). 
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) Statement on Global Corporate 
Governance Principles asserts “Corporate boards should be independent”. Corporate governance 
rating organisations such as Glass and Lewis and Co. look at economic consequences of 
corporate governance such as board independence. “An independent director is someone whose 
only non-trivial professional, familial, or financial connection to the corporation, its chairman, 
CEO or any other executive officer is his or her directorship.” (Nasdaq 2008). The NYSE, the 
Nasdaq and AMEX all require a majority of directors to be independent. 
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Hoye (2006) suggests that the source of leadership within voluntary sports organisation boards 
may emanate from either board chairs or executives and that when the individuals fulfilling these 
roles are able to develop mature relationships, the ability of the board to perform is enhanced. 
NFP entities then should also encourage the presence of independent directors on their boards, 
and if possible have a majority of directors to be independent, which concept is endorsed by 
most international stock exchanges. 
 
b) Duality of Roles of CEO and Chairperson 
This concept is also well-supported by international stock exchanges. The NYSE, the Nasdaq 
and AMEX all require a majority of directors to be independent (2008). “An independent 
director is someone whose only nontrivial professional, familial, or financial connection to the 
corporation, its chairman, CEO or any other executive officer is his or her directorship.” 
 It states the obvious: that the chairperson will be able to do his or her job more effectively if 
they exhibit true independence, that there is no other engagement with the company apart from 
their roles on the board. This allows the chairperson to run the meeting without any links to 
either the company, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or other board members. The promotion 
of ethical conduct amongst board members should allow for decisions to be made truly in the 
company’s interests. Thus NFP entities should promote the use of an independent chairperson. 
To avoid a boardroom that exhibits too much control, the roles of chairperson and the CEO 
should be performed by different incumbents. This is particularly true for family owned-and-run 
companies (such as those in Europe) where a family member typically controls the board. 
International evidence suggests that this duality yields too much power and control to one board 
member, whereas the separation of the roles encourages the corporation to acknowledge the 
input of all board members enabling them to add value to the decisions made by the board, 
without one person dominating the decision-making process. Once again, it appears there is 
wisdom in the NFP entity separating the roles of CEO and chairperson. 
The literature refers to the implementation of governance mechanisms such as the use of 
independent directors, and separation of the roles of CEO and chairperson. These mechanisms 
although endorsed by many stock exchanges on an international level, would also be applicable 
to NFP governance.  It has already been shown that good corporate governance is based on two 
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important premises: transparent governance structures and accountability to stakeholders (Gill et 
al. 2005).  These two concepts build on the previous literature review and are now the object of 
further examination. 
 
c) Board Equity 
The Global Financial Crisis demonstrated the importance of corporate governance. A recent 
review of regulatory regimes by the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee (CAMAC, 
2010) also advised that the composition of boards, its structure and codes of conduct are most 
important for continued business sustainability. The report highlighted three areas particularly, 
(1) board composition in terms of its knowledge and skills, (2) Board structure in terms of its 
ability to monitor and challenge management and (3) sociological and psychological factors such 
as composition, size and commitment to discharge its responsibilities and duties. 
In order to achieve this boards are encouraged to show diversity to gain a wider range of skills in 
terms of age, gender, race, education, industry experience and business experience. This in turn 
should foster an environment with divergent views and create robust discussion. Board equity is 
examined as part of this research. 
The literature review highlights that NFPs are significant players in the global economy.  These 
organisations play an important role in meeting community needs.  Positive financial and non-
financial information may impact donors’ views of a NFP organisation.  The issue of 
accountability to both  specific donors and the public at large increases demands for transparency 
in communication.  Good corporate governance is therefore an appropriate issue for such 
organisations. 
 
d) Audited Financial Accounts 
Accounts should be used to assess the overall wellbeing or health of the organisation, and is part 
of the system of good corporate governance and risk management. Accounts should be prepared 
for stakeholders to allow them to assess the organisation to be true and fair to its financial state. 
The role of the audit report is a risk management mechanism to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of the organisation to the board, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Role of Audit Report 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Public trust depends on transparent governance structures and processes, and accountability to 
stakeholders for the way in which business is conducted, how resources are used and the results 
that are achieved” (Gill, 2006. P.63). As stated by Catherine Bromilo, a partner at PwC, “people 
expect more from audit committees today” (2011), and The Institute of Internal Auditors (2011) 
stated that “audit committees . . . play an integral role in ensuring that the internal audit activity 
performs in the most professional and effective manner possible” (2011). Kent, Routledge and 
Stewart (2010) reiterated the importance of audit committees in relation to the reliability of 
reported earnings, and the use of the audit report.  
Following on from the literature, the research problem then is what type of governance do NFP 
entities demonstrate? Specifically the research questions are as follows:  
Do International and Australian NFP entities exhibit NFP governance by:  
Research Question 1) Using independent directors on their boards? 
Research Question 2) Separating the roles of CEO and chairperson? 
Research Question 3) Encouraging a diverse board? 
Research Question 4) Presenting audited financial information? 
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Method of Enquiry 
 
The review of the relevant literature has assisted in clarifying significant concepts and focusing 
the research questions. According to Yin (1989) and McBurney (1994), the appropriate research 
method should be selected according to the specific circumstances of the research objectives. 
They identify five research methods: being case study, experimental research, archival research, 
observational research and questionnaire research.  It is accepted that the selection of the 
research method for a study is critical, for it determines the appropriate information collection 
method within the research design (Aaker Kumar and Day 2004). The adopted methodology of 
sourcing archival data from publicly available sources was considered the most appropriate 
approach (Scheele, 1967).   
 
The 20 Australian NFPs chosen and the 247 International charities, while not a fully 
representative sample, are a purposive or judgment non-probability based sample and were 
selected on the basis of being an appropriate registered charity (Deductible Gift Recipient, ATO 
2008) for analysis (King 2004, Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran 2001). The chosen charities were 
each from separate studies completed a) In Australia (20) and on an international basis (247). In 
terms of this research paper only archival data is analysed to collect information and in this 
regard annual reports were analysed for their financial information (accountability), and any 
information relating to directors transparency, namely: duality of roles, independence and equity.  
The charities studied were chosen by random sample of the 247 Wikipedia listing of 
international charity organisations, as were 20 Australian charities. These were as a result of two 
previous studies undertaken, and were used to test any correlation between the two studies. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The listed international charities totaled 247, of which only 68 or 28% had a 2010 annual report 
listed on their website, thus 179 or 72% did NOT issue an annual report shown on their website. 
All 20 of the selected Australian NFPs had 2010 Annual Reports. There is a significant gap in 
accountability on the part of the international NFP entities, as it not only discourages donors and 
government grants, but it also raises the question of who are they accountable to? This alone 
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shows a distinct lack of corporate governance with 72% of the International charities giving no 
financial information in terms of accountability and transparency. 
Of the 247 international NFPs randomly selected via convenience sampling 11 or 16% of those 
with an annual report issued a corporate governance statement (or 4.45% of the total 247 NFP 
listed). According to listing rule 4.10 of the Australian Securities Exchange, only listed 
corporations are required to “comply or explain”. The OECD introduced its voluntary initial 
corporate governance principles in 1999, and a revised version in 2004. Those principles were 
specifically aimed at the protection of investors, directly in corporations and indirectly through 
stock exchanges, universities, and charities, and were aimed at diverse countries and regions 
(OECD, 2004) to encourage economic growth and stability. They are non-binding and used to 
encourage and inculcate ethical behaviour and values in international market places. With this 
small disclosure of corporate governance by NFPs, the message of the importance of governance 
disclosure is still underwhelming in the NFP sector, which shows a significant gap in both 
financial and governance disclosures. Of the 20 Australian charities only 2 had a separate 
corporate governance statement.  This data is summarised in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Annual Reports and Governance Statements 
 International NFPs n = 247 Australian NFPs n = 20 
Annual Report 68 
28% 
20 
100% 
Corporate Governance 
Statement (From those who 
had an annual report) 
11 
16% 
2 
10% 
 
Independent Board Members (Research Question 1) 
None of the International NFPs listed whether or not their directors were independent. The 
definition of independence usually relates to material dealings or previous employment or share 
ownership (ASX, 2007). As directors usually play a voluntary role, the issue of independence 
may not be significant in the NFP sector, however the literature still encourages the use of 
outside or independent directors to create a more balanced board. It is suggested that NFP boards 
disclose if directors are independent or not. 
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For the Australian NFPS, seven entities indicated they had both independent (non-executive) and 
executive directors (a total of 59 directors), 39 or 66% indicated they had non-executive board 
members, thus a majority of board members appeared to be independent. It is thus apparent NFP 
entities are complying with Australian governance recommendations in this area of board 
transparency. The effectiveness of individual directors however, is a function of independence, 
competence and behaviour.  
Duality of CEO and Chairperson (Research Question 2) 
None of the 20 Australian NFP entities and none of the international NFPS exhibited a duality of 
CEO/Chairperson role, showing they agree with the literature that the roles should be separated 
to enhance the workings of the board. The fact that no one person has ultimate control allows the 
board members to contribute equally and no balance of power remains. Further the role of the 
board chair is viewed as crucial and determinative of board effectiveness (Hough 2006). NFP 
boards should continue this practice as part of their NFP governance initiatives. 
Board Diversity (Research Question 3) 
Of the 247 NFPs analysed, only 32 (just under 8%) listed the number of people on their board, 
with an average of just under 8 board members being the usual size of the board, which agrees 
with the research done by Brown (2007) where it was suggested a board size of 8 was average. 
Of the NFPs that indicated the names of the board members, there was on average, twice as 
many male board members as there were female members. Of the 20 Australian NFPs analysed, 
the average number of board members was 9, and this was made up of 6 males and 3 females. 
Table 4 provides a summary of these findings. 
Table 4: Board Equity 
 International NFPs Australian NFPs 
Average Board Size 8 9 
Male Board Members 67% 67% 
Female Board members 33% 33% 
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Audited Financial Statements (Research Question 4) 
Only 10 International NFPs or just over 4% were NOT audited, this is possibly due to the fact 
they were a smaller branch of a larger home organisation, or that the audit report was not 
available as yet. Thus 237 or 96% presented audited financial statements. This result affirms that 
the NFP entities reviewed are being accountable in terms of their financial statements, a 
significant governance initiative.  All of the 20 Australian NFPS had audited financial 
statements. Of the 14 entities that indicated the names of their auditors three of the auditors were 
from ‘big four’ firms (KPMG, Deloitte, PwC and Ernst & Young), one was the Attorney 
General, and the remaining ten were audited by other firms.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
NFPs need to be more transparent in relation to their governance initiatives, especially in relation 
to individual board members and their qualifications. Rosen (2005) stated that “maintaining and 
enhancing public trust is essential for organizations that want to raise money.” It is 
recommended that NFP entities include in their annual reports a governance statement, which 
includes the following: 
1. Board of Directors information including qualifications and other directorships held.   
2. Specific details of the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO. 
3. Encouragement of the continuing need for board equity in terms of directors gender and 
qualifications. 
4. The continuing of audited financial statements in the annual report. 
The literature demonstrates that NFPs on an international basis are significant in terms of what 
they provide to communities, as well as their contribution to GDP and employment. Corporate 
governance in the literature has also been shown to be an important part of business 
sustainability. As yet the NFP sector has not fully embraced corporate governance initiatives, 
and it is hoped that this research further encourages NFP entities to initiate a governance 
framework which includes detailing directors qualifications, the use of independent directors, a 
diverse board, and the continuation of the separation of the CEO and chairman roles. It is also 
hoped that NFPs continue to release audited financial statements to increase their accountability 
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and transparency, as “the gap between public understanding and nonprofit reality is not 
sustainable” (Saxton, 2004). NFPs need to exhibit true NFP governance to bridge this gap and 
encourage future sustainability through grants and donations.  
This research was limited to archival data via annual reports. As the majority of NFP entities 
were subject to audit, it is also suggested for future research that the notion of audit committees 
in a NFP context be further researched as well as other related governance areas. Similarly 
related areas of good governance could provide fruitful areas for further study.   
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